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Abstract: The ubiquitous process of digitization changes economic competition on 
markets in several ways and leads to the emergence of new business models. The 
increasing roles of digital platforms as well as data-driven markets represent two 
relevant examples. These developments challenge competition policy, which must 
consider the special economic characteristics of digital goods and markets. In Ger-
many, national competition law was amended in 2017 in order to accommodate for 
digitization-driven changes in the economy and plans for further changes are already 
discussed. We review this institutional change from an economics perspective and 
argue that most of the reform’s elements point into the right direction. However, 
some upcoming challenges may have been overlooked so far. Furthermore, we dis-
cuss whether European competition policy should follow the paragon of the German 
reform and amend its institutional framework accordingly. We find scope for reform 
particularly regarding data-driven markets, whereas platform economics appear to 
be already well-established. 
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1.  Introduction 
New developments in the economy pose new challenges to competition policy, 
which is why it represents an area where institutions are subject to comparatively 
frequent change. This includes particularly more informal institutions like, for in-
stance, standard practices of market delineation, market power assessment, or mer-
ger control procedures as well as guidelines. However, notwithstanding, even codi-
fied law is amended quite regularly. For instance, just in 2017 Germany’s Law against 
Restrictive Practices (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) went 
through its 9th amendment since its implementation in 1958 (with a 10th amendment 
being already in discussion). 
The overarching economic development that fueled the recent amendment was the 
ubiquitous process of digitization. In this process, technology lowers the costs of 
storing, sharing, and analyzing data and by that, changes how consumers behave, 
how industrial activity is organized, and eventually how authorities need to operate. 
In terms of the protection of market competition, which is the primary goal of com-
petition policy, the emergence of giant online platforms and their business models 
based upon platform effects and the sophisticated employment of personalized user 
data drives modern challenges for competition authorities. Consequently, the recent 
9th amendment of German competition law was specifically and explicitly targeted 
at this development, aiming at making German competition policy fit for the digital 
age. Institutional change provides the precondition for the competent competition 
authority – the Federal Cartel Office of Germany (FCO; Bundeskartellamt) – to ade-
quately tackle anticompetitive arrangements and strategies involving digital goods 
(commodities, contents, services, rights, etc.). Insofar the process of digitization 
changes the way companies compete with each other, competition rules and their 
enforcement must reflect these changes.  
In this paper, we review the 2017 9th amendment of German competition law from 
an economics perspective and assess whether it fits to the economic peculiarities of 
digital business models. Furthermore, we analyze whether the geographically next 
higher level of competition policy – the European Union’s (EU) competition policy 
enforced by the European Commission (EC) – should follow the paragon of Germany 
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and reform its competition institutions accordingly. We argue that the insights of 
(digital) platform economics can and are already employed without considerable in-
stitutional change on the European level, whereas the characteristics of data-driven 
competition require changes along the lines of the German reform on the European 
level as well. Eventually, we point to some additional challenges that the German 
reform does not fully capture. 
 
2. What Challenges Does Digitization Pose to the Current Competition Insti-
tutions? 
2.1 The Economics of Digital Platforms 
When a market meets the following three conditions, it can be seen as a platform 
market (two-sided or multi-sided platform) in the sense of modern industrial eco-
nomics (Evans & Schmalensee 2007): 
- there are at least two distinct demand groups,  
- which are connected via indirect network externalities, and 
- transaction costs prevent these demand groups from coordinating themselves 
directly. 
Especially many digital markets meet these conditions; therefore, it is relevant to take 
a closer look into the economics of platforms to understand the basic economic con-
cepts of these markets. The classic example to illustrate two-sided platforms is the 
market for payment cards (inter alia, Rochet & Tirole 2002, 2003, 2006; Caillaud & 
Jullien 2003; Armstrong 2006). A provider of a credit card faces both the demand 
group of customers, who use the credit card as a means of payment, and the distinct 
group of merchants, who accept the credit card in their shops. The platform operator 
(here: the credit card provider) faces a so-called chicken-and-egg-problem by having 
to get both sides “on board”, i.e. simultaneously attracting high participation from 
each distinct customer group. By managing this problem and raising the number of 
participants on both sides, the platform operator induces two effects and, with that, 
enhances welfare for all market sides. Firstly, bidirectional indirect positive network 
effects occur where it is mutually beneficial for both demand groups if the number 
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of participants on the other side is increasing. These indirect network effects are es-
sential determinants of platforms. Secondly, the otherwise significant transaction 
costs of coordinating customers and merchants are reduced. It becomes more effi-
cient for the two groups to interact because the platform internalizes a connection 
between them. Otherwise, the transaction would be more expensive or not even 
possible at all.  
Coming back to digital markets, the above emphasized mutually positive indirect 
network effects can be found, for instance, on internet platforms like Ebay, Airbnb, 
Uber and various hotel-booking platforms (Haucap & Stühmeier 2016). There are also 
cases where network effects only occur in one direction. In advertising-financed me-
dia, for instance, there is a positive indirect network effect from the group of viewers 
or users on the group of advertisers: the more viewers or users a media provider has, 
the higher the benefit for companies that place their ads. However, this correlation 
does not exist necessarily the other way round: whether more advertising represents 
a positive effect for viewers is ambivalent at best. In many cases, there can even be 
a negative indirect network externality where viewers feel disturbed and annoyed by 
advertisements (Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006). Besides, there are often also direct 
network effects, which occur if users of a network service benefit directly from a 
higher number of other users within the same demand group (inter alia, Farrell & 
Saloner 1985; Katz & Shapiro 1985). Examples for this effect can be found in most 
communication networks: classic communication via telephone, online communica-
tion via social networks such as Facebook, or communication services like WhatsApp 
or Skype (Haucap & Stühmeier 2016). However, these types of network effects create 
some particularities with respect to competition policy. Associated with the demand-
sided economies of scale through the platform, indirect network effects foster con-
centration tendencies all the way to narrow oligopolies, dominant platforms or even 
platform monopolies. While the latter may be more allocatively efficient than mo-
nopolies in “ordinary” markets, i.e. providing a higher quantity than an “ordinary” 
monopolist does, they still create scope for market power-based anticompetitive 
market conduct (abuse of market power) and may yield considerable dynamic inef-
ficiencies.  
 
 
5 
 
Since competition remains the desirable market structure, the sustainability of com-
petition among platforms (in contrast to the emergence of dominant or monopolistic 
platforms) becomes very important even though platform markets will rather be 
(narrow) oligopolistic competition (instead of fragmented or atomistic competition). 
According to recent insights from economic theory, sustainable platform competi-
tion is the more likely (Evans & Schmalensee 2007; Farrell & Klemperer 2007; Haucap 
& Heimeshoff 2014; Haucap & Stühmeier 2016): 
- the weaker and/or the more asymmetric indirect network externalities are,  
- the weaker direct network effects are, 
- the lower economies of scale are (low importance of fixed cost digression), 
- the more user groups operate multi-homing (using more than one platform 
regularly),  
- the higher the market volume is, 
- the more heterogeneous the market is, i.e. the more heterogeneous user pref-
erences and goods (products, services, content) are, 
- the higher compatibility between different platforms is, 
- the stronger innovation dynamics in the market are, 
- the lower technical and behavioral economic switching costs are.   
The more the opposite of all these factors characterize a platform, the more likely is 
a tendency towards dominance or monopoly (sometimes called tipping). It is unlikely 
that this list of factors is already complete; it will rather probably be supplemented 
by ongoing and future research.  
Usually, transaction platforms are distinguished from non-transaction platforms (Af-
feldt et al. 2013; Filistrucchi et al. 2013a; Damme et al. 2010; Filistrucchi 2008). In 
the first case, transactions are directly concluded via the platform or are at least di-
rectly observable by it (as, for instance, in the case of Ebay). In the second case, this 
is not possible. Looking at the example of an internet platform, bringing together 
the group of users and the group of advertisers, transactions between these two 
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groups could emerge but are not concluded through the platform or even observable 
by the platform operator.1  
Another classification differentiates natural platform markets, where the platform is 
necessary for the coordination of the demand groups (prohibitive transaction costs), 
from artificial platforms, in which an "ordinary" market is deliberately re-organized 
as a platform to increase profits (of the platform operator). An example for the latter 
kind of platform would be Amazon, whose original core business was online retail-
ing, i.e. purchasing goods from producers for resale (classic vertical supply chain). 
However, Amazon later re-organized parts of its business as a two-sided platform 
(Amazon Marketplace): former upstream sellers/vendors, from whom Amazon pur-
chased goods, now became customers of Amazon’s platform marketplace leasing 
virtual salesroom on the platform in order to offer their products directly to consum-
ers. With that, Amazon has gone from an online retailer to an online shopping mall, 
focusing on bringing suppliers and buyers together and providing transaction sup-
porting services. Today Amazon operates both business models and, depending on 
current profitability, shifts goods from Retail to Marketplace and back.  
A relevant antitrust implication relates to the problem of economic dependence. Plat-
forms may become a gatekeeper to online transactions, i.e. that sellers must be pre-
sent on these platforms in order to reach their customers. For instance, it may be 
indispensable for the business of certain sellers or shops to be present on Amazon 
Marketplace or to be findable through Google Search; otherwise, significant parts of 
their market may be foreclosed for them. Incentives for a platform to engage in fore-
closure activities surface particularly in the case of vertical integration, i.e. if plat-
forms perform a dual role as platform service and content provider. For instance, if 
the organizer of a digital marketplace (platform) also acts as a shop operator (user 
of the platform on the side of “sellers/shops”) or providers of ranking services (search 
services as well as recommendation services) also rank their subsidiaries’ businesses 
in comparison to their competitors, they experience incentives to favour their own 
contents and services at the expense of competitors. In such cases, market power 
                                                          
1  However, data-based payment systems such as "pay-per-transaction" partially break this line of 
reasoning. 
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towards vertically related (upstream or downstream) companies may surface already 
way below traditional market power positions and the superior bargaining power of 
the gatekeeper platforms may allow for exploitative abuses towards (upstream or 
downstream) economic-dependent firms (Baye & Morgan 2001; Bougette et al. 
2017; Dinerstein et al. 2018).  
Some more particularities need to be taken into account in terms of market delinea-
tion, the determination of market power and the competitive assessment of entre-
preneurial strategies.  
Regarding the pricing, a platform operator has not just to choose a single price for 
the supplied service or good but must develop a complete pricing structure (Rochet 
& Tirole 2003). Overall, the platform subsidizes the platform side from which the 
higher indirect network effects emanate by an increased price for the platform side 
with lower indirect network effects. Thus, profit-maximizing platforms apply asym-
metric pricing, which internalizes the indirect network effects. Examples for advertis-
ing-financed platforms with asymmetric pricing structures are social network services 
(like Facebook), search engine services (like Google), recommendation services (like 
Amazon), editorial content sites (like online newspapers), or audio-visual content 
platforms (like YouTube or Spotify).2 Another, reverse, pricing strategy is often ob-
served in computer-based industries. Here, the platform vendors get most of their 
profits from the consumers of electronic devices (like smartphones or gaming con-
soles) instead of charging high fees from the app or hardware developers (Evans et 
al. 2004). In both cases, it can be profit- and welfare-maximizing to set optimal prices 
for one demand side below marginal costs and subsidize this side by setting the price 
for the other demand group above marginal costs (Rochet & Tirole 2003). This asym-
metric pricing structure is efficient, so that neither pricing one of the demand groups 
below marginal costs necessarily constitutes an anticompetitive foreclosure strategy, 
nor the pricing of the other demand group above marginal costs necessarily implies 
an abuse of market power.  
                                                          
2  This is not a purely online phenomenon; for example, some local newspapers are distributed to 
households free of charge, financed by advertising.  
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Traditionally, market delineation often starts with the so-called SSNIP-test (“Small 
but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price”), where it is examined if a firm (hy-
pothetically) is in the position to profitably (and not only temporarily) raise its price 
by 5-10 per cent above the competitive price level. The price increase would be called 
unprofitable, if consumers see sufficient substitutes for the good and switch to them. 
In this case, there would have to be more companies or products in the relevant 
market that have to be considered for the market definition. However, the interrela-
tion of the platform sides and peculiar pricing structures make it difficult to use the 
SSNIP test for market delineation in platform markets (inter alia, Evans & Noel 2005, 
2008; Evans 2009; Argentesi & Filistrucchi 2007; Filistrucchi et al. 2013b). The inter-
nalized indirect network effects between the different demand groups cause the 
problem that, in order to evaluate the profitability of a potential price increase on 
one market side, the reactions on the other market side need to be taken into ac-
count (so-called feedback effects). That starts with the decision on which price in-
crease (on which market side) should be computed higher and whether if just one 
price should be increased or all prices simultaneously (Evans 2003; Haucap & 
Stühmeier 2016). A possible price increase on one market side could also lead to 
negative user reactions on the other market side and, therefore, an overall negative 
outcome for the platform operator. To avoid the described problems, a few papers 
discuss possible ideas to apply the SSNIP-test to platform markets (inter alia, Evans 
& Noel 2005; Argentesi & Filistrucchi 2007; Filistrucchi et al. 2013b) for example by 
taking different elasticities or the changes in profits on both market sides into ac-
count. All these possible concepts require a high quality of data and estimation tech-
niques, creating strong practical limits to the application of these concepts.  
 
2.2  The Economics of Personalized Data and Privacy 
The economics of personalized data (or sometimes economics of privacy) is another 
area that has a bigger significance on online markets than on “standard” markets 
(Budzinski 2016). Overall, the commercial employment of information about con-
sumers is advantageous for the strategic choices of suppliers – both on online and 
offline markets. However, online and offline markets differ in terms of possibilities 
to collect and analyze individualized (personalized) customer data. Customers are 
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usually anonymous on offline markets like classic stores, for instance, if they pay with 
cash. In order to collect personalized data in such markets, customers must be in-
duced to provide it, for example via discount systems, payment with debit cards, etc. 
Online, however, customers must identify themselves (at the latest when they pay 
and with non-digital goods also through the delivery address). In these markets, 
there are several ways to personalize customer data and to extract individual infor-
mation (e.g., cookies, IP-identification, personalized accounts, etc.). Next to simple 
personal data (like names, addresses, payment information, etc.), these devices are 
particularly suitable to track more sophisticated personal data, for instance, data 
about individual consumption histories, search patters, and (online) lifestyles. So-
phisticated personalized data allows for drawing conclusions about individual pref-
erences of customers including both stated preferences (for instance, through “like”-
buttons, ratings, comments on goods and suppliers, etc.) as well as revealed prefer-
ences (for instance, through actual buying behavior). Intelligent pooling of simple 
and sophisticated data and advanced data analysis allows online companies to know 
significant more about their customers’ preferences than offline companies do. Over-
all, the possibilities to collect personalized customer data as well as the possibilities 
to profitably use this data are much bigger on online markets than on traditional 
offline markets.3  
A crucial phenomenon of the digital age is paying with data instead of (or in addition 
to) paying a monetary price for goods. Furthermore, there are two more types of 
markets on which personalized data plays a significant role (Acquisti et al. 2016): 
markets on which bundles of personalized data are a transaction object (data trad-
ing) and markets for data extraction and privacy technologies (data software).  
Although many online services and contents appear to be free of charge for users at 
first glance, the common price in traditional currency is usually only replaced by a 
data-price, which means that the provision of personalized data serves as a means 
                                                          
3  See for overviews on the literature about the (industrial) economics of personalized data and pri-
vacy Acquisti et al. (2016), Brown (2016), and Budzinski & Kuchinke (2018).  
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of payment. A platform operator may pursuit several commercially profitable busi-
ness models to lower the monetary price of online offers – often down to zero 
(Budzinski 2017; Budzinski & Grusevaja 2017; Budzinski & Kuchinke 2018): 
i. Better personalized targeted advertising: with better and more extensive per-
sonalized customer data, advertising can better target those customers who 
more likely prefer the advertised product and, thus, a higher probability to 
actually purchase the advertised good. This increases the advertisers’ willing-
ness to pay and the overall price for advertising, leading to increasing revenues 
from selling advertising space by the online supplier (which in this case acts 
as platform; see section 2.1).  
ii. Individualized goods such as individualized searching and recommendation 
services or individualized products. Offering goods as well as accompanying 
services tailormade to the customers’ needs and preferences creates incentives 
for more transactions (increasing demand) and, thus, more sales and reve-
nues.  
iii. Improved opportunities for data-based price discrimination: based on individ-
ual consumption patterns and search histories, providers may derive more re-
liable assumptions about the consumers’ individual willingness-to-pay. In 
combination with further personalized data about their ability to pay (for ex-
ample income, daytime of the purchase, places of residence and work, type 
and brand of the used device, etc.), that may lead to data-based individualized 
prices. Thus, differences in the individual willingness to pay can be skimmed 
off, what can be used for increasing both the sold quantities and the average 
profit margins. 
While profitable for business, consumers face several ambivalent and controversial 
implications from the commercial employment of their personalized data (Budzinski 
2017; Budzinski & Grusevaja 2017; Budzinski & Kuchinke 2018): 
i. On the one hand, consumers benefit from better targeted advertising because 
the received ads better fit the consumers’ preferences (Acquisti & Varian 2005; 
Tucker 2012; Brown 2016). On the other hand, the overall amount of received 
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advertising increases what may disrupt consumption and increase avoidance 
costs. Overall, welfare effects are ambivalent (Tucker 2012).  
ii. On the one hand, paying with data saves consumers’ money because the mon-
etary price decreases (sometimes even to zero), increasing consumer welfare 
because it can be used to buy additional goods and personalized data does 
not expire and can be repeatedly used to “buy” online services and contents. 
On the other hand, there is the question about the worth of personalized data. 
Whether consumers overall benefit from a transaction depends on both the 
subjective value they attach to their data (their preference for data protection 
and/or privacy) and how well they are informed about the market value and 
the use of personalized data (information about the actual extent of the pay-
ment). In contrast to paying with traditional currencies, paying with data lacks 
transparency of pricing and consumers notoriously find it more difficult to 
assess and evaluate the actual price. Imperfect individual information 
(knowledge about the commercial use and value of personalized data will di-
verge strongly across consumers with possible distribution effects at the ex-
pense of bad informed customers) and a lack of experience with the currency 
“personalized data” are problematic aspects here and give rise to asymmetric 
information in favor of the providers.  
iii. The individualization of products and services should typically be welfare en-
hancing due to better matching the preferences of the consumers (Acquisti & 
Varian 2005). 
iv. Data-based price discrimination decreases consumer surplus in favor of pro-
ducer surplus (redistribution effects) and leaves less income left for further 
consumption options due to eroding consumers’ rents (cross-market effects) 
leading to an overall smaller basket of available commodities for consumers. 
If data-based price discrimination is widespread, then, in this consumption 
basket, the goods that are most strongly preferred and/or most urgently 
needed will be particularly expensive whereas less preferred goods may be-
come cheaper, thus leading to a welfare-decreasing change in the composi-
tion of the basket (commodity basket effects). Furthermore, recent behavioral 
economics research demonstrates that data-based price discrimination yields 
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negative welfare effects as soon as ‘naïve’ (considerably bounded-rational) 
consumers are present on the market (behavioral effects; inter alia, Heidhues 
& Köszegi 2017; Heidhues et al. 2017). In particular in combination with mar-
ket power (e.g. in narrow oligopolistic structures often prevalent in online 
(platform) markets) these effects are likely to outweigh the (first-semester 
textbook) possibility of increasing quantities in markets where the individual 
ability-to-pay determines demand more than the individual willingness-to-
pay.  
Next to causing different economic effects than traditional markets, data-driven mar-
kets further aggravate and complicate the task of market delineation (in addition to 
platform-related problems; see 2.1). If, for instance, users do not pay a monetary 
price for digital goods, it becomes impossible to compute SSNIP-styled price in-
creases. Moreover, even if a data-price for contents or services would be considered, 
it is difficult to estimate this “price” (Haucap & Stühmeier 2016). Furthermore, the 
individualization of goods further handicaps the delineation of markets. 
Since only the smart combination of standard personalized data with different types 
of more sophisticated personalized data (including stated preferences data and re-
vealed preferences data) allows for both extremely profitable and very exploitative 
business strategies at the same time, incentives to employ a walled garden strategy 
must be considered (Schweitzer et al. 2018). It refers to the bundling of diverse online 
services into one data-based platform business so that consumers conduct as many 
online activities as possible within this platform, allowing the platform company to 
maximize its knowledge about the consumer. The Chinese multi-purpose service 
WeChat represents an example.4 On the one hand, consumers may benefit from this 
one-stop shopping opportunity, on the other hand, it creates considerable power 
over the consumer that may be exploited commercially (in all of the above discussed 
                                                          
4  Originally a messaging service, WeChat (owned by Tencent) now combines services like social net-
working, video telephony, video portal, mobile payment system, city services (e.g. booking trans-
portation or doctor appointments), news feed, localization and maps, job search, etc. – The (busi-
ness or government) ideal that a consumer never has to leave the virtual landscape (or ecosystem) 
of a service and content provider while being online (and, thus, actually never really and truly 
enters the internet) is a vision that has always been present since the internet developed. 
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ways) or – considering government-owned or -influenced/-controlled platform com-
panies – even politically.  
When companies have tracked and collected personalized consumer data, an addi-
tional source of revenue may come from selling either bundles of data or data anal-
ysis services (i.e. results from analyzing the raw data) to third parties (data trading). 
This may increase incentives for companies to create intransparency of data-usage 
towards consumers, strategically exploiting asymmetric information. As such, data-
trading markets complicate the task for consumers to keep track with the commercial 
exploitation of their data and aggravate privacy issues, pointing to possible negative 
welfare implications at the borderline of consumer-welfare-oriented competition 
policy and consumer protection policy (Kerber 2016). On the other hand, data-trad-
ing markets may reduce foreclosure effects and, thus, promote competition: if per-
sonalized data is vital for doing business in a given market, access to such data may 
become an entry barrier or a means of deterrence. Notwithstanding, the virtually 
endless reproducibility of personal data by the consumers and the crucial role of 
smart data pooling and analysis rather than pure data quantity alleviate foreclosure 
effects in data-based markets. 
The battle between the development of more and more sophisticated data tracking 
and extraction technologies and the development of better protection technologies 
(data-software markets) plays another important role. If this battle is about even, a 
level-playing field between suppliers and users of online goods limits several poten-
tial welfare concerns of data-based markets (Acquisti & Varian 2005). However, if 
one side significantly outcompetes the other side, power asymmetries may aggravate 
potential problems. The vested interests behind data tracking and extraction tech-
nologies may be better organized and better organizable than the heterogeneous 
and fragmented group of users and consumers, probably creating considerable im-
balances in the development race. 
Eventually, the welfare implications of data-based markets and business strategies 
considerably depend on assumptions about consumer behavior and distribution of 
imperfect information. In a Stigler-Posner-Varian world populated by (hyper-)rational 
(‚smart‘) consumers and characterized by information disadvantages of the service 
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providers the use of personalized data is mostly efficiency- and welfare-enhancing 
and data-based abuse of market power is unlikely (Stigler 1980; Posner 1981; Varian 
1997). However, a Behavioral-Economics world populated (also) by bounded-rational 
(‚naive‘) consumers and with information advantages of the service providers offers 
considerable scope for data-based profits at the expense of consumer welfare, pro-
vides incentives for abusive strategies towards consumers and economic-dependent 
upstream or downstream companies, and the presence of welfare-decreasing and 
anticompetitive effects becomes more likely (inter alia, Taylor 2004; Hermalin & Katz 
2006; Shy & Stenbacka 2016; Bougette et al. 2017; Heidhues et al. 2017; Heidhues 
& Köszegi 2017; Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch 2018). At the end of the day, it is an empirical 
question, which of these two worlds represents a more adequate description of the 
reality of online business in times of digitization. 
 
2.3  Further Challenges from Digitization 
Since the process of digitization is in full swing, it is impossible to give a definite list 
of further and future challenges for competition policy. Instead, the following three 
aspects represent a subjective choice of currently upcoming developments that may 
entail new challenges for competition policy institutions and practice.  
One of the distinct features of the digital economy is the increasing role and im-
portance of algorithms. This has fueled a discussion whether algorithmic pricing, i.e. 
prices set by algorithms, may lead towards collusive equilibria and cartel-like struc-
tures without competition agencies being able to combat because of the lack of re-
sponsible legal persons conducting the deed (Ezrachi & Stucke 2017). This may re-
quire institutional reforms in order on include algorithm-based collusion in the cartel 
prohibition. The emerging economic literature on the probability of learning ma-
chines setting algorithm-based prices in an oligopolistic market and – unintended by 
their programmers and implementers – ending up in a collusive equilibrium derives 
considerably differing conclusions (inter alia, Salcedo 2015; Calvano et al. 2018; 
Schwalbe 2018) and skepticism about the imminence and the widespread character 
of this problem may be justified (Schwalbe 2018). It looks significantly more likely 
that pricing algorithms may be employed to conceal deliberate cartels from prosecu-
tion agencies, for instance, by employing price circles and complex price movements 
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instead of a constant cartel price. This may make it more difficult for competition 
agencies to detect price cartels and it may require new detection and analysis tech-
niques in competition policy practice (as well as awareness of such developments in 
courts) but it does not require institutional change, i.e. a change of the law. 
The process of digitization also changes the ways of goods production (internet of 
things, smart production and manufacturing, machine-to-machine communication, 
industry 4.0) and consumption (digital personal assistants). The first case addresses 
intelligent systems (or ecosystems) of digital networks, which may allow for a largely 
self-organized industry production. This implies intensive communication (also 
among “things”) and interconnectedness along and across supply chains requiring 
new forms of (data-based) inter-company cooperation. While this development of-
fers significant welfare-enhancing potentials, the extended inter-company coopera-
tion along supply chains may raise antitrust concerns similar to vertical integration. 
As a consequence, the tendency towards a rather lenient competition policy enforce-
ment against vertical cooperation and integration may need to change and a re-
invigorating of antitrust control of vertical cooperative and collusive structures may 
be necessary (inter alia, Salop 2018). Crucially, this may include both securing the 
access to data if this is essential for a third-party to provide a competing service or 
product (danger of foreclosure) and preventing the sharing of data if this leads to 
collusive arrangements (Kerber & Frank 2017). Enhanced cooperation across supply 
chains may entail concerns about collusive arrangements among (direct or indirect) 
competitors as well as requiring a new assessment of conglomerate cooperation 
structures (Lim 2017). A further concern relates to the issue that even a welfare-
promoting cooperation network can form the structure for subsequent anticompet-
itive collusive arrangements once the cooperation has generated sufficient trust be-
tween the companies. While this altogether may not require a change of law, the 
rephrasing and modernization of guidelines and statements of policy directions may 
be necessary. 
Next to smart manufacturing, also elements of smart consumption may create both 
considerable benefits for consumers and pose new challenges for competition policy. 
In order to provide smart services, suppliers need comprehensive and far-reaching 
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personalized data from consumers about their economic (and other) behavior, ag-
gravating the issues discussed in section 2.2. A particularly interesting smart service, 
from an economic perspective, is the offering of so-called digital personal assistants 
(DPAs) such as Apples Siri, Amazons Alexa or Facebooks M. They manage and organ-
ize everyday duties and jobs of consumers, like a personal butler, including such with 
economic relevance. For instance, the DPA may take over the responsibility for rou-
tine shopping of daily goods (washing powder, cat food, etc.), e.g. in a smart home, 
it may notice if they are empty and automatically order new units – based upon its 
knowledge about the preferences (brands, etc.) of “its” user. Moreover, Alexa and 
her sisters also help with non-routine shopping decisions by providing information 
about offerings as well as ranking and recommending the best options – again ac-
cording to the perceived preferences of their users. While this obviously benefits con-
sumers by considerably reducing transaction costs, it also entails some anticompeti-
tive concerns (Budzinski et al. 2018; Ezrachi & Stucke 2018; Gal 2018). From an eco-
nomics perspective, the relation between a user and her DPA is a principal-agent-
relation with the user being the principal and the DPA being the agent. The econom-
ics of principal-agent-relations show that the agent virtually always pursuits her own 
interests next to and interfered with the principal’s interests. The scope for interests 
deviating from the preferences of the principal becoming relevant increases with a 
decreasing control over the agent – be it because control is impossible or impractical 
(or just not done). In the case of DPAs, the user’s ability to exert control depends on 
information asymmetries but should usually be quite high. However, her willingness 
to permanently control the DPA may be rather low because the advantages of using 
a DPA – reduced transaction costs – crucially depends on not controlling everything 
the DPAs does, decides, or recommends. Now, this may only be a concern if the DPA 
also follows other interests than the ones of the user. This scenario is particularly 
relevant if the producer of the DPA service has also other business interests because 
of a vertical or conglomerate integration with other businesses. If Amazon’s Alexa is 
to buy new cat food, for instance, Amazon surely has an interest to buy it from Am-
azon – irrespective of whether Amazon’s retailing offering is the best match for the 
user’s preferences. Such interrelations obviously entail considerable antitrust con-
cerns, in particular if the market of DPA services becomes dominated by a single 
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supplier, for instance, because of platform effects (Budzinski et al. 2018). However, 
the presence of naive users may allow for anticompetitive scope in an oligopolistic 
DPA market as well (similar to the reasoning in section 2.2). Furthermore, the walled 
garden strategy may enjoy reinforced popularity. Again, this example of smart con-
sumption points towards the necessity of an increasing sensitivity towards vertical 
and conglomerate interrelations when it comes to competition policy implications. 
In general, both the implications of platform economics and data economics (includ-
ing upcoming developments like smart supply and smart consumption) point to the 
necessity to re-assess the importance of vertical and conglomerate antitrust concerns 
(Petit 2016; Lim 2017; Salop 2018). The previously dominating paradigm that vertical 
and conglomerate arrangements and strategies are predominantly unlikely to cause 
consumer welfare damage is well-established – albeit mostly not in the codified rules 
of competition law but in guidelines, enforcement practices as well as in the minds 
of enforcers, lawyers and judges. Therefore, institutional change – of formal and in-
formal institutions – is necessary to improve the protection of competition vis-à-vis 
new challenges from digitization. Adequate competition rules and policies safeguard 
the mostly beneficial economic development towards the digital economy by frus-
trating anticompetitive and welfare-decreasing strategies and arrangements without 
destroying the beneficial process and its inherent innovative power itself – something 
that non-antitrust based regulation is likely to cause.  
 
3.  The 2017 Competition Policy Reform in Germany – A Paragon for Europe? 
After some controversial political discussion, a considerable reform of German com-
petition law came into force in June 2017. One of the main reasons for initiating this 
competition policy reform was the ongoing process of digitization and one of the 
main targets was to change antitrust institutions in a way to make them better fit to 
a digitized world and digitized markets, especially online markets (Deutscher Bun-
destag 2017: 2). Besides some other changes (e.g., regarding procedural aspects of 
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the so-called Ministererlaubnis5 and the enforcement of damage claims by cartel vic-
tims), the most relevant institutional changes relate to aspects of digitization such as 
online platform markets, the competitive role of (big) data, consumer protection in 
the digital age, and competitive relations between offline and online media (over-
view: Budzinski 2017).  
 
3.1 Digitization-related Elements of the German Reform 
Market Power of (Digital) Platforms 
First, the competition law now includes regulations concerning the special features 
of digital platforms. The newly added § 18 (3a) GWB mandates competition author-
ities to explicitly consider the economic features of platforms with respect to the 
delineation of digital markets, concerning the determination of market power and 
possible dominant positions in such markets, and regarding the evaluation of possi-
ble restrictive practices. In addition, new platform-related market power criteria were 
included in the law. These criteria are (i) direct and indirect network effects, (ii) the 
parallel use of several services (multi-homing) and the effort for users coming from 
the change of services (switching costs), (iii) economies of scale connected to net-
work effects, (iv) access to data relevant for competition, and (v) innovation-driven 
competitive pressure. The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy must re-
port to the legislative bodies after three years on the experience with these new reg-
ulations (§ 18 (8) GWB). 
Competitive Role of (Digital) Data 
The newly added § 18 (2a) GWB states, that it does not preclude the assumption of 
a market when services are provided free of monetary charge. In other words, the 
existence of monetary flows does not represent a constitutional element for a market 
in the sense of antitrust law. This clarification targets primarily digital markets, where 
service and content providers often do not charge a monetary price from consumers 
but, in return, collect and utilize personalized data of the users. 
                                                          
5  The Ministererlaubnis grants the federal minister of economic policy the power to overrule prohi-
bition decisions in the area of merger control by the Federal Cartel Office on the grounds of public 
interest considerations (Budzinski & Stöhr 2018). 
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In merger control, the institutional provisions governing when a merger is subject to 
review by the competition authorities were revamped in view of the increasing role 
of (personalized) data in competition, particularly in digital and online markets. To 
avoid the regulation of competitively unproblematic mergers among relatively small 
companies that have little impact on the market, the GWB defines minimum revenue 
thresholds, which must be exceeded in order to mandate a merger control review of 
a particular merger (§ 35 (1) GWB). So far, this limit has been € 500 million in world-
wide cumulative revenues of all involved companies as well as domestic revenues of 
at least € 25 million of one company involved in the merger and at least € 5 million 
of another involved company.6 These stipulations were complemented by an addi-
tional transaction value threshold: if the first two conditions are met but not the 
third, the proposed merger is still subject to merger control if the value of the com-
pensation (usually the transaction volume, i.e. the purchasing price of the acquired 
company) exceeds € 400 million and the acquired company significantly operates in 
a domestic market (§ 35 (1a) GWB). This implies that now such mergers are subject 
to review by the FCO where the value of the acquired company is not determined by 
revenues but predominantly by other valuable assets (e.g. data stocks, technologies, 
innovations, intellectual property rights, etc.) as it often happens with upcoming in-
novative start-ups in the digital economy. 
Consumer Protection and Competition Policy 
One of the most controversially discussed topics in the context of the reform was the 
question of whether the FCO should acquire competences in the field of consumer 
protection policy. Traditionally consumer protection law in Germany is strictly sepa-
rated from competition law, especially regarding enforcement, whereas in the Neth-
erlands, for example, since April 2013 a common authority is responsible for both 
competition and consumer protection (Authority for Consumers and Markets 2018). 
With Germany’s 2017 reform, the FCO received consumer protection competencies 
for the first time, albeit strictly limited. Now, the competition authority can conduct 
                                                          
6  In addition to the protection of micro-mergers from regulation, these thresholds also serve as the 
vertical delimitation of powers for the merger control of the European Commission and the (in-
complete) horizontal allocation of competencies between the member states of the European Un-
ion (Budzinski 2006).  
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so-called sector inquiries, if there is reasonable suspicion of significant, permanent 
or repeated breaches of consumer law, which may affect the interests of a large 
number of consumers – unless these violations fall within the remit of another federal 
authority (§ 32e (5) GWB). These sector investigations were first implemented into 
the law with the 7th amendment of the German competition law in 2005. The aim is 
to gain comprehensive knowledge about the examined markets, not necessarily to 
file claims against individual companies. This knowledge is in turn an important da-
tabase for further proceedings of the FCO (Bundeskartellamt 2018).  
This addition to competition law aims primarily at digitization effects and online 
markets, for example violations of the general terms and conditions on online plat-
forms (as in the current German Facebook case; Budzinski & Grusevaja 2017). In ad-
dition, the new regulation concerns systematic violations of the Law against Unfair 
Competition (UWG), which may be difficult to detect by civil law enforcement alone. 
Facilitating Cooperation between Press Publishers 
The last aspect considered here is the extension of special regulations for (offline) 
press publishers. Publishers of printed press products (newspapers and magazines) 
are already exempted from the prohibition of cartels in relation to vertical agree-
ments (resale price maintenance). In addition, horizontal cooperation between press 
publishers is now facilitated. The general prohibition on cartels (§ 1 GWB) no longer 
applies to agreements between newspaper or magazine publishers in case they want 
to cooperate as long as this cooperation strengthens the economic basis of the com-
panies involved, in regard of inter-media competition (§ 30 (2b) GWB). However, 
cooperation in the editorial area still is explicitly excluded and continues to be cov-
ered by cartel prohibition. The explicit reference to inter-media competition is a clear 
signal that the underlying goal of this institutional change is facilitating the economic 
cooperation of traditional newspaper publishers to strengthen their competiveness 
vis-à-vis new digital and online media. And with that, ultimately protect the press 
variety.  
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3.2  Pros and Cons of the German Reform  
Market Power of (Digital) Platforms 
The list of factors introduced in §18 (3a) GWB displays a remarkable fit to the state 
of platform economics (see section 2.1). It adds access to competition-relevant data, 
which we discuss in the context of data-driven markets. As a factor of market power, 
an emphasis on the exclusivity of data owned by a company may have been helpful 
because big data is not per se problematic due to the reproducibility and multi-use 
of personal data by the consumers (see section 2.2) (Schwalbe 2017). Two relevant 
factors are, however, missing from the list: the heterogeneity of consumer prefer-
ences and compatibility between services. Both represent relevant factors that should 
not be neglected when analysing digital platforms in an antitrust context. Compati-
bility is addressed indirectly by the reference to switching costs. However, there is 
more to compatibility and interoperability than switching costs (Kerber & Schweitzer 
2017). Its relevance also relates to its characteristic as a strategic choice by service 
providers who can decide to allow for compatibility with competitors’ services and 
products or block this. Incentives to choose the blocking option may be low in com-
petition, however, a market powerful company may employ it to protect and further 
strengthen its dominance. It represents an interesting observation that many coun-
tries enforce compatibility in telecommunications (e.g. mobile telephony) in order to 
preserve competition and challenge incumbents, whereas dominant social network 
service providers or instant messenger service providers are allowed to deliberately 
create incompatibility with fringe competitors (as well as with maverick competitors). 
Such a strategy choice is profitable for market powerful companies but questionable 
and worrying regarding consumer welfare. Strategically generating incompatibility, 
strategically complicating and handicapping multi-homing as well as strategically in-
creasing switching costs may lead to a tipping of a platform market, i.e. the market 
turns from a (competitive) oligopoly into a monopoly or a quasi-monopoly. Thus, 
these strategies may already be harmful before a platform dominates a market be-
cause they facilitate the way towards an incontestable dominance. This points to-
wards the necessity to broaden the scope for combating abuse strategies beyond the 
borders of dominance. For instance, the burden of proof in abuse-of-dominance 
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cases generally appears to be “unsatisfiably high” (Podszun 2018: 5-6) and a reinvig-
orating of enforcement against exploitative abuse (towards consumer but also to-
wards economic-dependent companies) remains desirable (Bougette et al. 2017). Al-
together, however, the 9th amendment represents an improvement and contributes 
to adequate competition rules in the light of digitization. 
Competitive Role of (Digital) Data 
Here, the German competition policy reform entails a number of important improve-
ments. First, the clarification that transactions without monetary remuneration can 
constitute markets unambiguously makes paying-with-data markets subject to com-
petition law, which is absolutely necessary from an economic point of view. This may 
be an important precondition to combat possible negative consumer welfare effects 
from data-based business models like excessive advertising, inflated data-prices or 
data-based price discrimination – without eroding such innovative business models 
altogether. Second, complementing revenue-based merger control provisions by ad-
ditional transaction- and value-based thresholds addresses a relevant phenomenon 
of mergers and acquisitions in the digital business world. Young innovative compa-
nies may yield considerable transaction values despite a lack of significant revenues. 
Their acquisition by large, market-leading incumbents may raise antitrust concerns if 
they represent innovative mavericks, who reinforce dynamic competition by devel-
oping and introducing innovative, (for the incumbent) disruptive business models 
and ideas. Powerful incumbents may impede dynamic competition by effectively tak-
ing these mavericks off the market through an acquisition. Therefore, it is important 
for welfare that competition authorities review such mergers. In both cases, the in-
stitutional reform enables the competition authority to better identify and combat 
innovative anticompetitive arrangements and strategies in data-driven markets. At 
the same time, it preserves the welfare-enhancing innovation dynamics in these mar-
kets as only the in-depth competition analysis by the authority will reveal whether 
significant antitrust concerns need to be combated. In contrast to sector-specific reg-
ulation, welfare-increasing innovation dynamics and incentives remain unrestricted. 
While the institutional changes in German competition policy generally improve an-
titrust dealing with data-driven markets, the prospective and upcoming issue of data-
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based price discrimination remains neglected. In the light of current economic the-
ory, it may not be sufficient to consider data-based price discrimination as an anti-
competitive strategy reducing consumer welfare only in the case of market power 
(as an example of a possible abuse strategy). From an economics perspective, how-
ever, incentives to implement data-based price discrimination may arise considerably 
below market power thresholds in the digital economy where markets are data-
driven. And if behavioral economics represent an adequate description of consumer 
behavior, then welfare-reducing effects are likely to be imminent. The issue may have 
been neglected in the 9th amendment because it is largely something yet to happen 
– despite already existing elements within dynamic pricing systems (e.g. online airline 
ticket sales) and test runs (e.g. Amazon; Budzinski & Köhler 2015). However, it will 
be an issue for possible future reforms, also because its widespread implementation 
entails potential to (further) reduce the popularity of the market economy within the 
population since, once it is recognized, it is likely to violate widespread fairness per-
ceptions (in addition to the negative consumer welfare effects). 
Consumer Protection and Competition Policy 
Whether consumer protection policy and competition policy should be conducted by 
the same agency in a one-stop shop or remain separate areas of enforcement is a 
highly interesting and very relevant discussion, which, however, goes beyond the 
scope of this paper (for some general insights into the new conditions of consumer 
protection see, inter alia, Ezrachi & Stucke 2016; Decker 2017; OECD 2018). Even 
though the 9th amendment only allocates sector inquiry powers (but no enforcement 
or sanction powers) to the FCO, it does represent an initial step towards combining 
these two policy areas. 
Facilitating Cooperation between Press Publishers 
In contrast to the other reform elements who seek to improve the protection of com-
petition in digital markets, the far-reaching facilitation of horizontal cooperation and 
collusion among publishers of printed press obviously rather targets the protection 
of a traditional (and outdated?) business model against digitization and against com-
petition from new competitors from the digital world. While it is already doubtful 
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whether the preservation of pre-digital publishing structure represents a desirable 
goal, it moreover appears to be improbable that such a goal may be reached through 
allowing for collusive structures. A significant improvement of competitiveness to-
wards new digital press goods and a necessary adaptation to changing consumption 
behavior can hardly be achieved by cementing obsolete models. From an economic 
perspective, this element of the German competition policy reform is certainly no 
paragon for any other reform. 
 
3.3 Further Reform Plans in Germany 
Despite the very young history of the 9th amendment, preparations for a 10th amend-
ment of German competition law have already started again putting a focus on dig-
itization-related institutional change. The process towards such a 10th amendment is 
expected to take up to two years. First, a study was commissioned with the goal to 
explore reform needs regarding the norms on abusive practices. The final report was 
submitted in August 2018 (Schweitzer et al. 2018). Second, in September 2018, the 
German government installed a commission called Competition Law 4.0 targeting 
the modernization of competition law and the harmonization of the institutional 
framework for the digital economy. It shall focus on competition policy recommen-
dations – both for Germany and Europe – regarding the increasing importance of 
data-driven markets and business models, the proliferation of platform markets, and 
the emergence of industry 4.0 (smart production and smart consumption).7 Next to 
the protection of competition from powerful and dominant (digital) companies, the 
commission shall, inter alia, seek for ways to promote the emergence of European 
players in digital markets and to fuel digital innovation and investment in digital 
technologies. It is expected to conclude its work by autumn 2019.8 Since the work 
                                                          
7  A rather similar commission was implemented in the UK, also with a view to a September 2019 
deadline. See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/work-kicks-off-to-examine-digital-competi-
tion-in-uk (accessed September 20th 2018). European Competition Commissioner Margrethe 
Vestager called a special advisory panel in 2018, set to deliver a report by March 2019 on virtually 
the same topics. See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/an-
nouncements/commission-appoints-professors-heike-schweitzer-jacques-cremer-and-assistant-
professor-yves_en (accessed September 20th 2018). 
8  The commission’s members are predominantly from law but it notably also features the head of 
Germany’s Monopolies Commission, antitrust economist Achim Wambach. 
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of the second commission has just begun at the time of writing, we focus on the 
final report of the first commission in this section. 
The study argues from an economics perspective that there can be cases where neg-
ative competition and welfare effects may be the consequence of unilateral strate-
gies by enterprises with market positions below the level of dominance. Thus, the 
current competition policy regime in Germany (even after the 2017 reform) and also 
in Europe entails the danger of so-called false negatives, i.e. cases of anticompetitive 
conduct that competition authorities do not or cannot combat. Predominantly, three 
case constellations are viewed to present need for institutional change (Podszun 
2018; Schweitzer et al. 2018): 
(i) Platform markets with a tendency towards tipping (from a competitive 
market to a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic market), i.e. markets char-
acterized by strong positive network effects, should be addressed by a new 
provision addressing the biggest platforms with superior growth-rates in a 
market – irrespective of whether they match market dominance thresholds 
or not. In such cases, impeding competitors should be prohibited if this 
may foster tipping. Similar conduct within narrow oligopolies of similar 
sized platforms, in particular towards fringe competitors and oligopoly 
outsiders should also be prohibited. This new prohibition provision below 
the market dominance threshold particularly addresses strategic compli-
cating and/or handicapping of multi-homing and/or switching to other 
platforms (e.g. in the case of single-homing), for instance, through artifi-
cial incompatibility, exclusivity obligations (or incentives), sophisticated 
tariff- and pricing structures, artificial switching costs (including features 
strategically complicating or impeding switching), etc. (Schweitzer et al. 
2018: 59-64). 
(ii) In the digital world, market power and its abuse may not only result from 
strong positions in supply or demand but also from a privileged position 
as a relevant intermediating force. Therefore, the study recommends add-
ing power in intermediation to the law, definitely regarding transaction 
platforms but possibly also regarding non-transaction platforms (Schweit-
zer et al. 2018: 42-43, 66-78). Furthermore, manipulating information 
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should become a regular example for the abuse of such an intermediation-
power position. 
(iii)  In data-driven markets, access to data may be necessary to compete; 
therefore, the study encourages further reflections on data sharing obliga-
tions. It proposes to assume an abusive impediment if, within a value-cre-
ating network, an enterprise is blocked from access to automatically gen-
erated data that is necessary for some substantial value creation (Schweit-
zer et al. 2018: 78-83).  
In order to address these case constellations, the study recommends adapting provi-
sions about relative market power and economic dependence. By contrast, it explic-
itly rejects the idea to complement the existing prohibition of an abuse of dominance 
(Art. 102 TFEU; § 19 GWB) by a prohibition of (deliberate) monopolization and at-
tempts to monopolize similar to U.S. antitrust law (Schweitzer et al. 2018: 43-45). 
Furthermore, it considers replacing the prohibition of abuse of dominance by a SIEC9-
style test à la merger control, i.e. a general prohibition of enterprise strategies that 
significantly impede effective competition, irrespective of market power (market 
power would merely become a facilitating factor for conducting such strategies but 
not a necessary condition anymore). However, the study emphasizes the danger of 
an increasing number of false positives, i.e. competition policy interventions against 
efficient, procompetitive enterprise strategies as well as an increasing legal uncer-
tainty because abuse control, in contrast to merger control, is no ex ante regulation 
(Schweitzer et al. 2018: 45-47).  
Thus, the study proposes a major reform of § 20 GWB, dealing with relative or supe-
rior market power and economic dependence (Schweitzer et al. 2018: 47-59). More 
precisely, the authors suggest dropping the hitherto restriction of economic depend-
ence situations to small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in § 20(1) GWB, so 
that all companies being in an economic-dependent position (i.e. facing superior 
market power) could be a potential victim of abusive practices (Schweitzer et al. 
2018: 56-59). So far, it was legally not possible to suffer from an abuse of superior 
                                                          
9  Meaning “Significant Impediment of Effective Competition”  
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market power if you are not a SME – but economically, of course, it is: “If food pro-
ducer Nestlé, for instance, needs food retailers like Edeka or Amazon, or if a large 
insurance company depends on access to a comparison portal, such undertakings 
may now rely on § 20 GWB despite their size and even if the other party is not dom-
inant” (Podszun 2018: 3). Such a reform would shift the focus of the respective pro-
vision away from a protection of SMEs towards a general abuse prohibition of supe-
rior market and bargaining power and, thus, push it more in line with modern eco-
nomics. 
In addition, the study suggests informal institutional changes. It encourages author-
ities to be more flexible with proof in abuse cases (= lower implicit thresholds) and 
expresses optimism that courts will be flexible enough to handle that as well as dif-
ficulties with market definitions (Podszun 2018: 3; Schweitzer et al. 2018: 34-40). 
According to the reasoning in the study, it should be sufficient to identify scope for 
company behavior not restricted by competitive pressure (and irrespective of market 
shares), i.e. the powerful company does not need to pay consideration to competi-
tors’ reaction to its own strategy in question (missing/absent competitive control of 
the companies behavior), combined with a sound theory of harm – somewhat ana-
logue to different competition intensities between pairs of companies in a heteroge-
neous market regarding unilateral effects in merger control. A market-powerful po-
sition of a company would then be concluded from the empirical existence of an 
unilateral conduct not subject to competitive control with an anticompetitive effect. 
Market power, then, is not only an absolute phenomenon on a pre-defined market 
but also a relative phenomenon in the interrelation of economic agents (be it – hor-
izontally, vertically or in a conglomerate way – among companies or towards con-
sumers). Regarding German law, this focuses on a more flexible handling of § 20 (3) 
GWB, i.e. relative market power in horizontal relations. An amendment of the law is 
not deemed to be necessary. 
Furthermore, the authors suggest continuing the path of the 9th amendment with 
respect to merger control (introduction of transaction value threshold) and focus on 
preventing the acquisition of mavericks by powerful companies. Consequently, the 
study proposes a prohibition of acquisitions that take potential rivals off the market 
(as a novel violation of the SIEC-criterion). 
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In contrast to these reform proposals, the study sees no need to re-address conglom-
erate power as a relevant issue of abuse control (Schweitzer et al. 2018: 83-91). Alt-
hough it admits an increasing relevance of conglomerate arrangements and strate-
gies in the digital economy, the study conjectures that most cases should fall under 
traditional dominance criteria in at least one of the relevant markets so that no 
amendment of the law is necessary. Remaining cases not captured by the existing 
law could be dealt with a more flexible approach to relative market power in hori-
zontal relations (§ 20 (3) GWB). However, the authors also lament deficits in eco-
nomic theory addressing digitization-driven new forms of conglomerate power 
(Schweitzer et al. 2018: 89), implying that new insights may cause a change in their 
assessment. 
Generally, the fundamental direction of the study’s recommendations is to put em-
phasis on stopping the rise of monopolists instead of waiting with interventions until 
a company is settled into a dominant position, i.e. a tougher stance on companies 
on the rise towards incontestable dominance.10 Podszun (2018: 6) derives as the key 
lesson: “Keep markets open, otherwise intervention may be too late.” These further 
reform proposals address some – but not all – of the shortcomings identified for the 
9th amendment.  
 
4.  Towards a Digitization-focused Reform of EU Competition Policy? 
While there are many similarities between antitrust institutions on the EU-level and 
on the German level, they are not identical. Thus, the question arises whether a re-
form mirroring the German 2017 amendment would be necessary or, at the least, 
helpful to improve the fit of European competition policy with the peculiarities of 
competition in the digital age as well. Since the provisions to facilitate enhanced 
cooperation among traditional press publishers cannot be classified as sensible com-
petition policy from an economic perspective, we focus on the other reform ele-
ments, in particular on the explicit introduction of platform economics and the role 
of personalized data. 
                                                          
10  Podszun (2018: 4) provides a similar conclusion adding: “This is a viable lesson from the Google 
cases that achieved too little too late.” 
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4.1  Platform Economics in Current EU Competition Policy 
The unsuitability of traditional market delineation tests for platform markets and 
paying-with-data markets is already considered in recent EU cases. For example, in 
the prominent Google Shopping case, opened in 2010 and ending in summer 2017 
with a fine of € 2.42 billion for “abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal 
advantage to own comparison shopping service” (European Commission 2017b). The 
EC found that Google used its high market shares in the market for search engines 
(more than 90 per cent in all 31 states of the European Economic Area over several 
years) and high barriers to entry (because of network effects) to give its own shop-
ping comparison service a prominent placement in search results while artificially 
lowering search entry ranks of rival comparison shopping services. That led to less 
user clicks and traffic on those rivals’ platforms and an increase of traffic on and of 
market shares for Google’s own shopping comparison site. This distortion of compe-
tition lowered the benefits for customers, like genuine choice and innovation pro-
cesses, all over Europe (European Commission 2017b).  
The Google search engine constitutes a platform, offering monetary free (but paid 
with data) search services for customers and paid-for advertising space for compa-
nies. The same applies to the shopping comparison service Google Shopping, which 
operates on a different relevant goods market (European Commission 2017a: 28). 
Therefore, the EC considered platform-related peculiarities in market delineation to 
some extent when refusing Google’s claim that the EC should have carried out a 
SSNIP test. This was justified by Google offering its services for free (without a mon-
etary price) to users (European Commission 2017a: 54). Instead of using a SSNIP-
test, the EC examined the market for general search services and the market for com-
parison shopping services by analyzing demand substitutability, supply substitutabil-
ity, and potential competition (European Commission 2017a: 28). Furthermore, the 
EC mentions indirect network effects and positive feedback effects on two-sided plat-
forms in connection with the general Google search engine as a barrier to entry 
and/or expansion (European Commission 2017a: 63-65). Furthermore, the EC applies 
elements of platform economics to assess markets, market power and (anti-) com-
petitive effects in other recent cases (for instance, Facebook/WhatsApp 2014; Fox/Sky 
2017; Google Shopping 2017; Google Android 2018). 
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4.2  Economics of Personalized Data in Current EU Competition Policy 
The inexperience of European competition policy enforcers with paying-with-data 
business models and privacy-related issues shows in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger 
case (Deutscher 2017a, 2017b). In fact, the EC considered – next to platform effects 
– that access to personalized data represents a potential barrier to entry and, there-
fore, a potential source for market foreclosure as well as a potential cause for in-
creasing market power. However, the EC’s analysis on both the effects and the prob-
ability of Facebook combining its datasets with WhatsApps lacked a sound data eco-
nomics fundament. Instead, the EC concentrated on platform-related effects like the 
multi-homing tendencies of many users, therefore, viewing both merging companies 
as competitive complements instead of being close competitors/substitutes in terms 
of data-based business models.11 Besides that, the EC somewhat naively relied on 
statements of the merging parties regarding ostensible technical impossibilities to 
combine their datasets, which not surprisingly turned out to be wrong retrospec-
tively.12  
The main problem of competition policy showing in this case is the reliance on mon-
etary assessments of most of the relevant aspects in an actually data-driven environ-
ment. These concepts are not sufficient to use in digital markets: a company with 
low revenues (like, e.g., WhatsApp) may appear to be of low competitive relevance 
when only looking at monetary terms. Nevertheless, through their datasets such 
companies can in fact be important players in the market, furthermore playing a 
maverick role for future competition. Thus, both unrecognized current competitive 
practices and underestimations of the role of the potential competitor of an acquired 
company for the buyer (as it happened in the Facebook/WhatsApp case) may occur. 
It can be an indication if (especially relatively young and innovative) companies 
                                                          
11  „Furthermore, the EEA market for consumer communications apps features a significant degree of 
"multi-homing", that is, users have installed, and use, on the same handset several consumer com-
munications apps at the same time. In particular, WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger have been 
reported as being the two main consumer communications apps simultaneously used by the ma-
jority of the users in the EEA. This fact suggests that the two consumer communications apps are 
to some extent complementary, rather than being in direct competition with each other.“ While 
in economic theory, multi-homing points towards competition among platforms, interestingly, it 
is interpreted to signal the opposite here. 
12  This providing of misleading information led to a fee of €110 million for Facebook in May 2018 
(European Commission 2017c). 
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achieve very high stock market valuations or purchase prices in case of takeovers, 
despite low sales figures – a potentially high economic value of the companies could 
probably be the reason for that and should be examined by competition authorities. 
Though, this examination cannot be enforced if a merger is not subject to institu-
tional control and/or regulation at all or is released due to “low importance” because 
of too low monetary turnovers combined with an inadequate assessment of the un-
derlying data-business logic.  
A recent (but still pre-reform) German case may serve to illustrate the pitfalls of 
purely monetary thresholds for merger control in the face of data-driven business 
models. In 2016, the two clearly leading long-distance bus operators in Germany 
(FlixBus and Postbus) announced a merger. In a “normal” case, this merger of quasi-
duopolists would have been investigated by the FCO. However, because of the spe-
cial business model of the companies and the market as such, the turnover thresh-
olds for German merger control were not exceeded and the authority did not have 
any legal basis for intervention (Bundeskartellamt 2016). In Germany, this gap was 
closed with last year’s amendment introducing transaction value thresholds (see sec-
tion 3.1). EU merger control, however, is still based upon (monetary) turnover thresh-
olds implying that the EC must rely on national competition regimes and their – vastly 
varying but predominantly monetary – thresholds to capture data-driven mergers 
with relevant anticompetitive effects and refer them to the EC.  
Regarding an adequate assessment of data-related (anti-)competitive effects, the EC 
just decided another relevant case. In September 2018, the EC cleared Apple’s (here 
especially the online music streaming platform Apple Music) acquisition of Shazam, 
a leading music recognition app (identifying playing music by its sounds and refer-
ring the app’s users to streaming and downloading services). The EC justified its in-
depth investigation with two theories of harm: firstly, whether the combination of 
Apple’s and Shazam’s consumer data could lead to a powerful market position of 
Apple Music because the combined entity would be able to directly target competi-
tors customers, and, secondly, whether Apple could be able to harm competitors 
after the merger by stopping referrals from Shazam to their services (European Com-
mission 2018). Although platform-related effects like network effects and multi-
32 
 
homing may have been neglected if the brief press release is indicative, the investi-
gation did focus on the competitive role of data, which is a positive first step in the 
right direction. Nevertheless, in the similar Facebook/WhatsApp case the EC also an-
alyzed a possible combination of datasets of the two merging parties and came, 
erroneously, to the conclusion that it would not be beneficial or even possible for 
the companies to do so (European Commission 2014b, 2017c). In the Apple/Shazam 
case, a combination of both datasets could be profitable for Apple in that regard 
that using Shazam’s data would allow Apple to improve its suggestion services. 
Shazam is used by consumers to get to know new music that was not suggested to 
them by a streaming service or else, but that they overheard in their direct environ-
ment. With the information collected through Shazam, Apple has access to better 
information than just the previously heard playlists and/or songs. Recommendation 
services are among the main services of music streaming platforms. The better this 
service, the more consumers are potentially attracted. It is very unlikely that Apple 
will ignore this competitive advantage. In particular, since the combination of data 
technically should hardly pose any problems. Furthermore, the incentives to bias the 
referral of Shazam users towards Apple Music will be considerable from an econom-
ics perspective. However, as the press release can offer only very brief insights into 
the EC’s reasoning, it remains to be seen what the detailed case report of the EC will 
look like in order to be able to carry out a deeper analysis of the case.  
An additional area where data-based effects will play a crucial role are markets where 
companies act both as a marketplace and as a merchant on this (or a related) mar-
ketplace. The “dual role” of Amazon as a marketplace platform for third-party shops 
and as a retailer of the same/similar goods involves issues about the use of market-
place data from third-party shops to optimize its own retailing business and/or ben-
efit its own competing offers at the detriment of the – possibly economic-dependent 
– third-party shops. Apple and Google enjoy similar “dual roles” when it comes to 
their app stores (representing marketplaces) where their own products compete with 
third-party apps. Economic dependence may be strengthened here by the exclusivity 
of the Apple App Store for devices with Apple operating system and of Google Play 
for those using Google’s Android operating system. 
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4.3  Do European Rules Need Institutional Change? 
In general, the institutional framework of European competition policy is proving to 
be rather flexible, based on rather general provisions that offer sufficient scope for 
introducing economically sound theories, concepts and techniques when it comes to 
antitrust cases involving digital platforms and data-driven markets. An amendment 
of the law – in case of the provisions codified in the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union not a realistic option anyway – may not be necessary. However, next 
to codified law, guidelines play an important role in European competition policy, 
facilitating the anticipation of competition policy decision and, thus, improving the 
deterrence of anticompetitive conduct and arrangements as well as legal certainty. 
The merger and antitrust guidelines of the European Commission are not very cur-
rent. For instance, the latest revision of the guidelines for horizontal mergers took 
place in 2004, the guidelines for non-horizontal mergers were last revised in 2008 
(European Commission 2014a). Therefore, it is not surprising that aspects of platform 
economics and economics of personalized data are not explicitly included here. As 
recent cases show (see sections 4.1 and 4.2), this does not preclude the EC from 
applying platform economics and (to a considerably lesser extent) the economics of 
personalized data. However, a revision of the guidelines, introducing platform-re-
lated (like in the German law) and data-related aspects to, inter alia, market power 
measures and assessments, would represent a welcome clarification. And, in partic-
ular regarding data-driven market conduct, there is also a deficit regarding econom-
ics in competition policy practice. 
A similar assessment relates to two necessary policy changes. The first continues a 
trend that the rising importance of unilateral effects analysis in heterogeneous and 
oligopolistic markets has already fueled. While the task of market delineation remains 
relevant, its relative importance further decreases. In an antitrust world where the 
(simple) economics of (standard) homogenous goods dominate, sound market de-
lineation is paramount to exactly quantify market shares which play an important 
role in assessing (anti-) competitive effects.13 However, in the more complex world 
                                                          
13  Consequently, cases were quite frequently decided upon market delineation issues in the past, 
particularly in the courtroom. 
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of heterogeneous goods, an anticompetitive impact on the process of competition 
does not depend that strongly on market shares anymore and, consequently, market 
delineation loses its gatekeeper character for competitive analysis (Farrell & Shapiro 
2010; Kaplow 2011, 2015). The effects of digitization further decrease the role of 
market delineation for the antitrust assessment of business practices and intercom-
pany arrangements both due to the multisided platform character and due to the 
peculiar role of data (see section 2.1 and 2.2). Since the role of market delineation is 
not codified in “hard” law, a policy change towards a less decisive role of complete 
and uncontroversial market delineations does not require a change of law. However, 
it appears to be questionable whether competition agencies and, in particular, courts 
and judges will be open enough to frictionless change from traditional practices to-
wards economically more adequate treatments of cases involving digital goods. The 
danger of decision errors based on reluctance to abandon “old-fashioned” (in rela-
tion to digitized markets) practices and embrace new perspectives is imminent. It 
may happen that a case actually involving severe anticompetitive effects may be 
cleared (directly by the EC or subsequently through a court in the legal revision pro-
cedure) on formalistic grounds of market delineation controversy, even though the 
latter may be rather irrelevant for the anticompetitive effects in question. Therefore, 
clarifying guidelines on the (limited) role and adequate techniques of market deline-
ation in digital (platform, data-driven) markets would represent a helpful tool to 
safeguard an economics-based case treatment – also on the European level. 
The same logic applies to other digitization-driven changes in competition policy, 
altering presumptions about the probability of anticompetitive effects in cases of (i) 
relative market power and economic dependence, (ii) vertical integration, and (iii) 
conglomerate power (see sections 2.3 and 3.3). In the area of abuse of dominance, 
the nature of digital goods markets requires a stricter and more active approach 
because the economic logic of these markets often favors narrow oligopolistic struc-
tures, in many markets on an intercontinental or even worldwide scale. In these mar-
kets, anticompetitive effects resulting from economic dependence gain importance 
and need to be addressed. However, will courts follow a more flexible use of antitrust 
doctrines and instruments, so that they can be used properly in digital markets, with-
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out an explicit and reasoned documentation of the underlying policy change (includ-
ing its application areas and its limits) in respective guidelines? Along the same lines, 
reinvigorating enforcement against vertical issues including moving away from the 
dominance of price and quantity-based assessments (data-driven markets and busi-
ness models!) may require stronger signals than “just” changes in the practice of 
case treatment. Eventually, the issue of a possible new importance of conglomerate 
power has not really been touched in digitization-related competition-policy-reform 
discussions so far. 
Maybe the one area where a change of law would be helpful from an economics 
perspective is merger regulation. Here, adding transaction-value-based thresholds 
following the German example would reduce the necessity to rely on national refer-
rals (and, thus, on sound and adequate national rules) in order to capture cases with 
community dimension in the digital economy and contribute to closing an enforce-
ment gap.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The process of digitization changes the nature of many markets along with entailing 
new business models as well as new pro- and anticompetitive strategies. In order to 
reap the benefits for society but preventing the pitfalls, competition policy must 
adapt to the challenges provided by digital markets. From an economics perspective, 
the two major trends coming along with digitization are digital platform markets 
and data-driven markets (see sections 2.1 and 2.2). The peculiar economics of these 
types of markets imply, inter alia, an increased relevance of market power position 
both in terms of absolute and relative market power (economic dependence), a de-
creasing relevance of short-run price and quantity effects (without rendering them 
unimportant), a decreasing importance of a complete and quantitative market delin-
eation as well as an increasing importance of (new) maverick competitors. Further-
more, both the implications of platform economics and data economics (amplified 
by upcoming developments like smart supply and smart consumption; see section 
2.3) point to the necessity to re-assess the importance of vertical and conglomerate 
antitrust concerns.  
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In 2017, German competition policy has implemented a significant reform of com-
petition law that is predominantly focused on digitization related issues and tackles 
some of the new challenges, in particular regarding platform economics and the role 
of personalized data (see sections 3.1 and 3.2). Furthermore, talks about and plans 
for a more comprehensive reform, again related to digitization, are already ongoing 
(see section 3.3), focusing on strengthening the enforcement against dominance-
abusing strategies in digital markets and expanding competition rules to cover cases 
of abuses of economic dependence situations as well. A stricter competition policy 
against conglomerate power and data-based price discrimination, in contrast, is not 
(yet) at the heart of the discussion. From an economics perspective, the 9th amend-
ment of German competition law (with some minor exceptions) as well as the de-
scribed proposals for a future 10th amendment point into the right direction. Both 
the recent reform and the current modernization study contribute to making German 
competition policy fit for the digital age. 
In contrast to Germany, European competition policy abstains from a digital-econ-
omy related reform of competition policy so far. However, this does not mean that 
elements of platform economics and – to a lesser extent – economics of personalized 
data are not taken into account in the treatment and handling of cases involving 
digital goods (see sections 4.1 and 4.2). Still, without being accompanied by institu-
tional change, the necessary changes in competition policy in order to cope with the 
challenges of digitization may be more difficult to implement systematically (see sec-
tion 4.3). For instance, the previously dominating paradigm that vertical and con-
glomerate arrangements and strategies are predominantly unlikely to cause con-
sumer welfare damage is well-established – albeit mostly not in the codified rules of 
competition law but in guidelines, enforcement practices as well as in the minds of 
enforcers, lawyers and judges. Therefore, institutional change – be it of formal or 
informal institutions – is necessary to improve the protection of competition vis-à-vis 
new challenges from digitization. Adequate competition rules and policies safeguard 
the mostly beneficial economic development towards the digital economy by frus-
trating anticompetitive and welfare-decreasing strategies and arrangements without 
destroying the beneficial process and its inherent innovative power itself – something 
that non-antitrust based regulation is likely to cause.  
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Therefore, we advocate a more explicit and proactive dealing with digitization-re-
lated challenges to competition policy. While we acknowledge that changing the law 
is virtually impossible and thanks to the general character of the relevant provisions 
also mostly not necessary (with the exception of amendments to merger regulation; 
see section 4.3), issuing guidelines for competition policy in digital markets and mar-
kets involving digital goods and/or personalized data may prove to be very helpful 
to implement a sound competition policy in the digital age. This may happen through 
an update of existing guidelines from the pre-digital age, complemented by new 
guidelines on abuse of market power and economic dependence (which would be 
helpful for other industries as well), or by publishing a guideline fully devoted to the 
digital economy. 
Following the economically-sound parts of the German reform in departing from 
monetary volumes with respect to market delineation techniques as well as determi-
nation of market power and, in particular, complementing revenue-based review 
rules in merger control by transaction value stipulations and/or company value-based 
indicators represents a good starting point. Furthermore, considering the more far-
going reform discussion with its emphasis on re-invigorating competition policy en-
forcement against company strategies abusing market power as well as expanding 
abuse control to include cases of economic dependence would be beneficial for con-
sumer welfare as well. The latter goes along with a less a priori lenient stance towards 
vertical integration and arrangements.  
Beyond the topics already on the agenda in the (German) reform discussion, two 
more issues should be considered in our opinion. The first is the issue of conglomer-
ate power, which is traditionally viewed to be a rather improbable case of antitrust 
concern. Mainly, the traditional reasoning focusing on the so-called deep pocket ar-
gument, emphasizing possible anticompetitive cross-market effects from financial 
power of conglomerates (cross-subsidization). Given the powerful positions of some 
of the digital players (like Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, etc.), the deep pocket 
concern may need to find renewed interest. Another more traditional reasoning is 
rooted in German ordoliberalism. This branch of economic thinking pays attention 
to the lobbyistic power of huge conglomerates, i.e. on the influence that big players 
gain on regulators and politicians. Currently, this may be more a concern for U.S. 
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antitrust policy as the big players are all from the U.S.14 – although this may already 
look different with respect to the discussion around special tax deals as antitrust 
concerns (Hrushko 2017; European Commission 2017d). From the realms of more 
modern economics, effects of multi-market contact – especially among the biggest 
players – could imply a new type of antitrust concerns. Furthermore, market structure 
dynamics from conglomerate relations towards horizontal or vertical relations 
through innovative (platform) services and more inclusive platforms (e.g. walled gar-
den strategies) may pose new challenges. Moreover, the modern economics of per-
sonalized data point to fact that a combination of personalized data from very dif-
ferent sources – so to say from conglomerate business activities – is potentially par-
ticularly attractive for companies and, at the same time, creates particularly excessive 
power over consumers. Data conglomerates may additionally control access to data 
along supply chains, creating scope for anticompetitive foreclosure strategies. 
The second issue relates to data-based price discrimination. While this practice is only 
starting to become a feasible business strategy in – currently – merely very specific 
circumstances, its potential for decreasing consumer welfare is considerable (see sec-
tion 2.2). Moreover, once consumers are confronted with data-based price discrimi-
nation regularly in their consumption activity, it has the potential to aggravating 
market skepticism (“unfair and exploitative practices by big capitalist firms”) and 
driving people to favor regulatory alternatives. Thus, competition authorities should 
be critical towards data-based price discrimination strategies, in particular in combi-
nation with relative or absolute market power. 
Altogether, digitization-related reforms of competition policy are beneficial to safe-
guard the predominantly welfare-increasing emergence of digital markets as well as 
business models and strategies. As the economic nature of this development favors 
an increase in (esp. relative) market power positions, competition policy needs to 
become less lenient and more active in combating the abuse of such positions as 
well as in preventing the emergence of (economically not necessary) absolute market 
power (for instance, by buying mavericks off the market). Next to the goal of an 
                                                          
14  However, the rising popularity of Chinese digital platforms should not be underestimated, also 
with a view to the pros and cons of contemporary Chinese competition policy. 
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economics-based competition policy, a more political reasoning should also be con-
sidered. If antitrust policy does not “tame the tech titans”, other regulation, which 
is less driven by free-market ideas, becomes more probable. 
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